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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction lies with the Utah Court of Appeals. A 
formal administrative hearing was held on July 16, 2015 
before the Adjudicative Hearing Office of J. Dennis 
Frederick. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2) "[t]he 
Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction ... over a 
final order ... from a formal adjudicative proceeding of a 
state agency .... " 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Statement of Issues Presented 
The principal issue of the case, and this appeal, is 
that Mr. Lopez contractually incorporated his decree of 
divorce into his life insurance contract with the 
Appellees, Utah State Retirement Board and Public 
Employees' Group Term Life Program (hereinafter together 
referenced as the "Life Program"), making his designation 
of Ms. Welty irrevocable pursuant to the terms of the 
incorporated contract. 
The hearing officer erred in his interpretation of 
Chapter 20, Title 40 of the Utah Code by denying Ms Welty's 
request for payment of life insurance proceeds. The 
principles of law and equity dictate that Ms. Welty was the 
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irrevocable beneficiary under Jesse Lopez's life insurance 
policy. The Life Program paid the incorrect beneficiary 
under a forbidden change of beneficiary form because Ms. 
Welty had been designated an irrevocable beneficiary under 
the terms of the incorporated contract. The hearing officer 
ignored clear authority when he denied Ms. Welty's request 
for payment of life insurance proceeds. 
Title 49 Chapter 20 of the Utah Code provides general 
guidelines for the state of Utah to create various group 
insurance programs for state employees. At the state's 
discretion, these programs may be offered to various cities 
to offer to city employees, at the city's discretion. Mr. 
Lopez, Ms. Welty's ex-spouse and Jacob Lopez's father, 
elected to participate in some of the offered programs 
offered by his city employer. 
The statute is general in nature and allows the state 
to develop its own guidelines in offering and administering 
these insurance products. The applicable guidelines to the 
case at hand is known as the Life Program Group Term Master 
Policy (the "Master Policy"). The Master Policy creates the 
contractual obligations of the Life Program and the covered 
employees. The Master Policy specifically allows for the 
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written statements of covered employees to be part of the 
contract. Nothing in the Master Policy prevents a covered 
employee from irrevocably designating beneficiaries, nor 
does any provision permit the Life Program to administer 
the contracts in contravention of a court order. 
Unfortunately the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law provide a scant record related to the hearing officer's 
interpretation and application of title 49, the contractual 
issues presented before the officer, or review of the 
applicable case law. The record's deficiencies highlight 
the need for this appeal. There are no findings of fact or 
conclusions of law related to the incorporation of the 
divorce decree into Mr. Lopez's life insurance contract. 
There are no findings of fact or conclusions of law related 
to Ms. Welty's argument about the forbidden nature of 
subsequent change of beneficiary forms. There are no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law related to the Life 
Program's actions taken in contravention of a court order. 
Standard of Review 
The hearing officer's order relies on interpretation of 
Title 49, Chapter 20 of the Utah Code. The Court of Appeals 
reviews decisions related to interpretation of statute 
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under a "correction-of-error standard" and gives no 
deference to the Board's interpretation under the Act. 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are determinative to the 
issues set forth in this appeal: 
" ( 1 ) The program sh a 11 : ( a ) act as a s e 1 f - insurer of 
employee benefit plans and administer those plans .... " 
Utah Code Ann. 49-20-401(1) (a) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The case stems from Ms. Welty's demand for payment of 
life insurance proceeds on a life insurance policy upon the 
death of Jesse Lopez. The life insurance policy was 
administered by the Life Program. The facts are largely 
1 See Hilton v. State Ret. Ed., 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 405, 
2005 UT App 408 (Utah Ct. App. 2005); Epperson v. Utah 
State Ret. Ed., 949 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); 
O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Ed., 929 P.2d 1112, 1114 
(Utah Ct.App.1996), cert. granted, 939 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1997); Allred v. Utah State Retirement Ed., 914 P.2d 1172, 
1174 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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agreed to by the parties. 
The Life Program wrongfully paid life insurance 
proceeds according to a forbidden change of beneficiary 
form. Diane Welty and Jesse Lopez divorced in 1997 and, per 
the divorce decree, Mr. Lopez was to "maintain in full 
force and effect" a life insurance policy which designated 
Diane Welty the irrevocable beneficiary for the benefit of 
the children as long as child support was due. 
Mr. Lopez complied with the decree by submitting a copy 
of his divorce decree along with his beneficiary change 
form to the Life Program, administered by the Life Program. 
The submission of the divorce decree met all legal 
requirements to incorporate the irrevocable designation of 
Ms. Welty as beneficiary into Mr. Lopez's contract with the 
life program. This incorporation by written statement was 
specifically allowed by the terms of the Master Policy 
which governs the contractual relationship between Mr. 
Lopez and the Life Program. By attaching a copy of the 
divorce decree, the Life Program was notified that the 
beneficiary change was irrevocable under Utah law. The Life 
Program was bound by the Third District Court ruling and 
was contractually bound to abide by the irrevocable 
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language in the divorce decree. Utah law is clear that when 
there is an irrevocable clause in a court-entered decree of 
divorce, it must be obeyed. The Life Program was 
contractually bound to designate Ms. Welty future 
beneficiary until Mr. Lopez's youngest child reached an age 
of majority. 
During the formal hearing, the administrator of the 
Life Program declared that the PEHP has the authorization 
to refuse forms based upon a number of factors. Any change 
of beneficiary form submitted prior to the time Jacob Lopez 
turned majority age was forbidden pursuant to court order 
and incorporation of such court order into the contract. 
PEHP should have denied any attempts made by Mr. Lopez, or 
anyone else, to circumvent the parties' contractual rights 
or the court-entered divorce decree. 
The order by the Utah State Retirement Board is 
contrary to the principles of equity, as well as 
interpretation of the contract. First, Ms. Welty had 
limited ability to monitor the beneficiary of the life 
insurance. Her only real method was to file motions in 
state court related to Mr. Lopez's obligations under the 
divorce decree. She did so, and Mr. Lopez complied with his 
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obligation by providing a copy of the divorce decree to 
designate Ms. Welty the irrevocable beneficiary to the life 
insurance. Ms. Welty had no way of knowing, or monitoring 
if Mr. Lopez decided to submit a subsequent change of 
beneficiary form. 
On the other hand, the Life Program had a simple method 
of monitoring, by simply making note on the file that the 
beneficiary had been designated as irrevocable and forbid 
subsequent attempts to change the beneficiary forms. 
Further, the life insurance was in place, until the 
children reached the age of majority, to provide support 
for Mr. Lopez's biological children. Mr. Lopez desired for 
his son, Jacob, to attend college and specified to Jacob 
and Ms. Welty that these funds from the life insurance 
policy were to help support Jacob's education. The Utah 
State Retirement Board's mistake robbed Jacob of the 
intended benefit of the life insurance. Jacob has 
significant student loan debt because the Life Porgram 
granted the benefit of the life insurance to the wrong 
person. 
Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Welty filed a request for board action after her 
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claim on certain life insurance proceeds was denied by the 
Life Program. Ms Welty subsequently amended her request on 
April 5, 2013. The case proceeded through the 
administrative framework and was heard at a formal 
administrative hearing on July 16, 2015. The parties 
submitted stipulated facts and the only testimony taken at 
the hearing was from Ms. Welty, Jacob Lopez, and Chris 
Lamkin. 
Disposition Below 
The hearing officer ruled that the Life Program 
conformed with the requirements of Title 49, Chapter 20. 
The hearing officer did not offer a legal memorandum of his 
decision and his decision contains very little citation to 
statute or law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Stipulated Facts 
The parties largely stipulated to the facts of the 
case. The statement of Stipulated Facts is included in the 
record page number 240. Ms. Welty and her son incorporate 
the Stipulated Facts in their entirety and recite them 
herein: 
1. Jesse Ga vino Lopez ("Mr. Lopez") was employed by 
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Salt Lake City Corporation ("City") and was covered by a 
group term life insurance policy offered to City employees 
through the Public Employees' Heal th Program ( "PEHP") Life 
Program. [R. 240, 1 1.] 
2. Mr. Lopez, and petitioner, Diane Welty ( "Ms . 
Welty") were married in August 1978 and divorced in October 
1997. [Id. ~ 2.] 
3. On October 29, 1997, a Decree of Divorce was 
ordered by Judge Pat B. Brian of the 3rd District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Utah. [Id. 1 3.] 
4. In the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Lopez was ordered as 
follows: 
24. That the Respondent currently has in force and 
effect a life insurance policy on his life in the 
face amount of $325,000.00. That Respondent is 
ordered to maintain in full force and effect said 
life insurance policy until such time as the last 
of the parties' children reaches age 18 or alimony 
terminates, whichever is later. During the period 
that the child support is due, the Respondent 
should be ordered to irrevocably designate the 
Petitioner, as trustee for the minor children, 
beneficiary on said life insurance policy. The 
Respondent should be ordered to provide the 
Petitioner with proof that the insurance is in 
effect within 30 days of entry of the Divorce 
Decree and providing verification that said 
insurance is in effect by January 15th of each year 
thereafter. 
[Id. 1 4.] 
5. In July 1999, Mr. Lopez had coverage of $173,000.00 
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with the Life Program, of which $50,000.00 was funded by the 
City and the rest funded by Mr. Lopez. [Id. ~ 5.] 
6. On December 3, 1999, PEHP received a Group Term 
Life Application from Mr. Lopez dated on or about November 
29, 1999. The application indicated that Mr. Lopez was 
applying for $300,000.00 in Basic Group Term Life Coverage. 
The application named Diane (petitioner) for minor children 
as per attached divorce decree and Mary Ellen Lopez his wife 
as secondary beneficiary. Mr. Lopez's request for additional 
coverage was cancelled in December 1999 based upon contact 
from the City's Human Resources Department. [Id. 1 6.] 
7. On December 3, 1999 the Life Program received a 
Beneficiary Change Form signed by Mr. Lopez on November 29, 
1999 which listed Petitioner, "Diane (petitioner) for minor 
children as per attached divorce decree" as primary 
beneficiary and Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as secondary 
beneficiary. [Id. ~ 7.] 
8. The Life Program received a written copy of the 
Decree of Divorce entered by the Third District of the State 
of Utah on October 29, 1997 attached to the Beneficiary 
Change Form submitted by Mr. Lopez on or about December 3, 
1999. [Id. i 8.] 
IO 
9. In a Verified Response to Petitioner's Order to 
Show Cause signed by Mr. Lopez on December 6, 1999, Mr. Lopez 
provided the following: 
a. On or about the 31 st day of October, 1997 this 
Court entered a Decree of Divorce based upon 
the entry of Respondent's default. 
b. The Decree of Divorce contained a number of 
misstatements of fact, some even inconsistent 
with the terms of the Petition from which the 
default was taken. Respondent was not provided 
with a copy of the Decree of Divorce until long 
after the time to set the default had expired 
under Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. 
c. In reality Respondent never had a life 
insurance policy on his life with a face amount 
of $325,000.00. 
d. At the time of divorce Respondent owned two 
policies. The first was a basic term policy 
offered through his employment for 
approximately $100,000. The second was a 
universal life insurance policy offered through 
Allstate Insurance which insured his life for 
only $50,000.00, and which also insured the 
life of Petitioner for $50,000.00. (See 
Exhibit "A") [Exhibit not included] . Thus, 
Respondent's factual burden to carry insurance 
has always been approximately $150,000.00. 
[Id. l 9.] 
10. On July 24, 2003, the Life Program received an 
Additional Group Term Life Employee Enrollment Form signed by 
Mr. Lopez on or about July 15, 2003. Mr. Lopez applied for 
additional coverage up to $300,000. The designated primary 
beneficiary was Petitioner Diane Lopez, his ex-wife for minor 
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child $300,000 per divorce decree and his son Petitioner 
Jacob Lopez as contingent beneficiary. This beneficiary 
change form also reflects Jacob Lopez's date of birth as 
August 27, 1988. However, Mr. Lopez did not complete 
underwriting requirements, and he was never issued the 
additional coverage. [Id. 1 10.] 
11. In addition to the Additional Group Term Life 
Employee Enrollment Form on July 24, 2003, PEHP received a 
Beneficiary Change Form signed on or about July 15, 2003, by 
Mr. Lopez. The form revoked any previous nominations of 
beneficiary(ies) and designated Mary Ellen Lopez, his wife, 
and his ex-wife Diane Lopez petitioner for minor child as 
primary beneficiaries. [Id. 1 11.] 
12. On October 24, 2003, PEHP received a Group Term 
Life Change Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about October 21, 
2003. The form stated in relevant part: "Revoking any 
previous nomination or beneficiary ( ies), I hereby designate 
the following indi victuals to receive all benefits payable 
upon my death." Mr. Lopez designated Mary Ellen Lopez, his 
wife, as primary beneficiary and Joshua G. Lopez, his son, as 
contingent beneficiary. [Id. 1 12.] 
13. On March 20, 2006, PEHP received a Group Term 
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Life/Accident Plan Beneficiary Change Form signed by Mr. 
Lopez on or about March 13, 2006. The form stated in 
relevant part: "Revoking any previous nomination or 
beneficiary(ies), I hereby designate the following 
individuals to receive all benefits payable upon my death. n 
Mr. Lopez designated Mary Ellen Lopez, his wife, as primary 
beneficiary. [Id. ~ 13.] 
14. Mr. Lopez died on July 9, 2006. [Id. 1 14.] 
15. Jacob Lopez was 17 years old at the time of Mr. 
Lopez's death. [Id. 1 15.] 
16. On July 26, 2006, PEHP received a Group Term Life 
Program Claimant's Statement from Mary Ellen Lopez. [Id. 1 
16. ] 
17. On or about August 2, 2006, PEHP issued a check in 
the amount of $173,000.00 to Mary Ellen Lopez, the 
beneficiary designated on the Group Term Life/Accident Plan 
Beneficiary Change Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about 
Mar ch 13 , 2 0 0 6 . [ Id. ~ 1 7 . ] 
18. The Life Program Group Term Life Master Policy 
("Master Policy") is the contract between the Life Program 
and its covered members. [Id. 1 18.] 
19. The Master Policy states: 
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PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
If a Subscriber and/or Dependent dies, the 
Plan will pay to the beneficiary, subject to 
the provisions set forth herein, the amount of 
coverage for which the Subscriber and/or 
Dependent is covered. 
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary .. 
. . Any payment made in good faith pursuant to 
this provision fully discharges the Plan to the 
extent of the payment. 
BENEFICIARY 
A Subscriber shall designate a primary beneficiary 
and a contingent beneficiary at the time of 
application for coverage. A Subscriber may change 
his or her beneficiary(ies) by filing a written 
notice of the change with the Plan. The change 
will take effect as of the date the Subscriber 
signed the notice of change ... Any payment made 
by the Plan in good faith pursuant to this 
provision shall fully discharge the Plan to the 
extent of such payment. 
MODIFICATION 
No change in this Master Policy shall be valid 
unless approved by the Plan and unless approved by 
the Plan and unless such approval is evidenced by 
endorsement or amendment to this Master Policy. 
No agent has authority to change this Master 
Policy or waive any of its provisions. 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
A written notice of claim must be given to the 
Plan within (20) days after the death of a 
Subscriber and/or Dependent unless it was not 
reasonably possible to do so. Notice given by or 
on behalf of a Subscriber and/or Dependent or his 
beneficiary if any, to the Plan at its office in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, with information sufficient 
to identify the Subscriber and/or Dependent, shall 
be deemed notice to the Plan. 
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TIME OF PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
Benefits payable hereunder will be paid as soon as 
reasonably possible after receipt of an acceptable 
written proof of loss together with all supporting 
materials. . . . 
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary. 
If any payment remains unpaid at the death of the 
beneficiary, or if the beneficiary is a minor or 
is, in the opinion of the Plan, legally incapable 
of giving a valid receipt and discharge for any 
payment, the Plan, at its option, may pay such 
benefit to any relative or relatives by blood or 
connection by marriage of the Subscriber and/or 
Dependent who is deemed by the Plan to be 
equitably and legally entitled to receive the 
payment. Any payment made in good faith pursuant 
to this provision fully discharges the Plan to the 
extent of the payment .... 
LEGAL ACTION 
No legal action may be brought against the Plan 
for unpaid benefits until at least sixty (60) days 
after written proof of loss has been furnished in 
accordance with the requirements stated above. No 
legal action may be brought after the expiration 
of three years after the time written proof of 
loss is required to be furnished. 
ENTIRE CONTACT 
This Master Policy, any modifications to it, and 
the written statements, if any, of Subscribers, 
constitute the entire contract. 
[Id. 1 19.] 
20. On August 28, 2012, Petitioner, Ms. Welty submitted 
a notice of claim to the Life Program in which she presented 
a dispute regarding the distribution of Mr. Lopez's life 
insurance coverage. [Id. ':II 20.] 
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21. Ms. Welty indicated that Mr. Lopez had a life 
insurance policy with Allstate Life Insurance in the amount 
of $300,000.00 on or about October 29, 1997. [Id. 1 21.] 
22. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-618 "All data in 
the possession of the office is confidential, and may not be 
divulged by the office except as permitted by board action." 
Petitioners were not, and could not be, supplied with 
beneficiary designation information until they brought this 
request for board action. [Id. 1 22.] 
23. On or about May 1, 2012, Diane Welty and Jacob 
Lopez served a summons and complaint to Utah Retirement 
Services and PEHP in Third District Court to recover life 
insurance proceeds paid by PEHP through the Group Term Life 
Plan to Mary Ellen Lopez the designated beneficiary of Mr. 
Lopez. Mary Ellen Lopez was also named as a Defendant in 
this action. [Id. 1 23.] 
24. On September 19, 2012, the action brought in Third 
District Court against PEHP was dismissed without 
adjudication because the Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the claims against PEHP. In a Declaration 
submitted in the Third District Court, Petitioner, Ms. Welty 
indicated the following: "1 . Shortly after the death of my 
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ex-husband, Mr. Lopez, I contacted Mrs. Lopez regarding the 
life insurance proceeds for my minor son, Jacob Lopez. 2. 
Mrs. Lopez told me that she had discussed the issue with her 
attorney, and that she did not have to pay any money to 
Jacob, but merely had to list Jacob on the title to her 
condo." [Id. 1 24.] 
25. Petitioners filed an Amended Request for Board 
Action on April 5, 2013. 
~ On September 3, 2013 Respondents waived all arguments 
relating to barring claims pursuant to an applicable statute 
of limitations. [Id. 1 25.] 
The following additional facts from the administrative 
hearing are germane to the issues of appeal. 
~ Additional Facts 
1. Petitioners had power to determine that a submitted 
change of beneficiary form is invalid. [R. 299, 29: 
125, 30: 1-8]. 
2. Jacob Lopez has taken out student loans to fund his 
college education. [R. 299, 16: 15-25]. 
3.Ms. Welty filed a motion for an order to show cause 
against Mr. Lopez related to the requirement that he 
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carry life insurance and irrevocably designate Ms. 
Welty as a beneficiary. [R. 299, 8: 17-23]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Master Policy allows covered employees to 
incorporate written documents into their life insurance 
contracts. Mr. Lopez was ordered, in a divorce decree, and 
subsequently through a hearing on a motion for an order to 
show cause, to irrevocably designate Ms. Welty as the 
beneficiary of the life insurance until his biological 
children reached the age of majority. The life program was 
aware of this requirement because Mr. Lopez incorporated 
his divorce decree into his contract with the Life Program 
when he submitted a change of beneficiary form referencing 
a divorce decree that was in fact provided with the form. 
Mr. Lopez's incorporation of the divorce decree was 
accepted by the Life Program and established his 
contractual rights. Utah law recognizes a holder of a life 
insurance contract's ability to irrevocably designate 
beneficiaries. If the holder subsequently attempts to 
revoke an irrevocable beneficiary, the change of 
beneficiary is deemed forbidden and the insurance company 
bears the risk of paying under a forbidden change of 
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beneficiary form. 
Mr. Lopez's attempt to change his beneficiary to his 
new spouse while his children were still minors was 
forbidden. Because the Life Program had notice that Ms. 
Welty was the irrevocable beneficiary, it breached its 
contractual duties under the Master Policy by paying 
pursuant to a forbidden change of beneficiary form. The 
Life Program took the risk, and now should be responsible 
to pay the proceeds of the life insurance contract to Ms. 
Welty, for the benefit of Jacob Lopez. 
This result is fair in law and equity. Ms. Welty was 
legally unable to monitor the named beneficiaries of Mr. 
Lopez's life insurance contract. Ms. Welty took the 
necessary steps to force Mr. Lopez to irrevocably designate 
her as beneficiary, for the benefit of the minor children, 
of the life insurance contract. Ms. Welty accomplished just 
that, yet the Life Program ignored the court-ordered 
designation and paid pursuant to a forbidden change of 
beneficiary form anyway. 
Jacob Lopez, a minor child at the time of Mr. Lopez's 
death, has borne the burden of the Life Program's mistake. 
He has incurred substantial student loans in pursuit of his 
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education, one of the goals his father had set for him. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD OVERRULE THE ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE 
RETIREMENT BOARD BECAUSE JESSE LOPEZ'S INITIAL 
BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION WAS IRREVOCABLE AND ENTITLED 
PETITIONERS TO THE PROCEEDS OF THE LIFE INSURANCE 
POLICY UNDER UTAH LAW. 
A. The Divorce Decree was incorporated by reference in 
the Change of Beneficiary form submitted by Jesse 
Lopez and is part of a binding contract between 
Jesse Lopez and the Life Program. 
Ms. Welty and Jacob Lopez are entitled to the proceeds 
of Jesse Lopez's life insurance policy benefit through Life 
Program because Jesse Lopez made the initial beneficiary 
designation irrevocable by incorporating by reference the 
Decree of Divorce, which required him to maintain a life 
insurance policy with an irrevocable beneficiary designation 
in favor of the Ms. Welty and her son. The Utah Supreme Court 
echoes the coITu~on view that "the provisions of a divorce 
decree control the disposition of the proceeds of an 
insurance policy." 2 Utah's position seems to be the 
2 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485-486 (Utah 
197 5) . 
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overwhelming majority stance. 3 Even when a life insurance 
3 See e.g., Rollins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 
911 ( 7th Cir . 1 9 9 0 ) ( interpreting Indiana law) ( finding that 
mandated beneficiaries of a divorce decree life insurance 
provision have a vested right in certain proceeds of a 
decedent's life insurance policy naming another person as 
beneficiary when the decedent failed to comply with the 
divorce decree; Tintocalis v. Tintocalis, 20 Cal. App. 4th 
1590, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 659 (Cal. App. 1993) ("Where, as 
here, the obligor spouse violates an order to maintain life 
insurance, a constructive trust may be imposed."); Reeves v. 
Reeves, 236 Ga. 209, 223 S.E.2d 112 (Ga. 1976) (finding that 
children mandated beneficiaries had vested interest in 
certain proceeds of the decedent's life insurance policy); 
Appelman v. Appelman, 87 Ill. App. 3d 749, 410 N.E.2d 199, 43 
I 11 . Dec . 1 9 9 ( I I I . App . 1 9 8 0 ) ( finding that f o rrr.e r w i f e 
mandated beneficiary was entitled to the imposition of a 
constructive trust pertaining to proceeds of the decedent's 
life insurance policy); Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 
380 N.E.2d 189, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. 1978) (imposing 
constructive trust in favor of former wife mandated 
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policy's amount, policy number or even company are unclear, 
the rights established by the divorce decree stand. 4 
beneficiary); McKissick v. McKissick, 93 Nev. 139, 560 P.2d 
1366 (Nev. 1977) (finding that former wife mandated 
beneficiary entitled to life insurance policy proceeds); 
Thomas v. Studley, 59 Ohio App. 3d 76, 571 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 
App. 1989) (finding that mandated beneficiary child entitled 
to life insurance policy proceeds); Madsen v. Moffitt, 542 
P.2d 187 (Utah 1975) (finding that mandated beneficiaries 
were entitled to certain life insurance policy proceeds); 
Nielsen v. Nielsen, 535 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1975) (finding that 
mandated beneficiaries entitled to amount of life insurance 
policy proceeds specified in the divorce decree). But see 
Lock v. Lock, 8 Ariz. App. 138, 444 P.2d 163 (Ariz. App. 
1968) (finding that the mandated beneficiaries' only remedy 
is an action against the decedent's estate for breach of the 
divorce decree); Rindels v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 83 N.M. 
181, 489 P.2d 1179 (N.M. 1971) (finding that since no fraud 
was shown, mandated beneficiaries were not entitled to 
proceeds of life insurance policy). 
4 See Madsen v. Moffitt, 542 P.2d 187, 188 (Utah 1975). 
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Under Utah law parties may incorporate writings that are 
not written into the contract itself. The provisions of the 
referenced writings become fully enforceable parts of the 
contract. 5 Writings are incorporated by reference when they 
are clear and unequivocal, alert the parties that the terms 
are being incorporated, and the writing is easily available 
to the parties. 6 The incorporated writing governs the 
contractual relationship of the parties as if the writing was 
included in the four corners of the contract. 7 
In the instant case, the Life Program Group Term Master 
Policy (the ''Master Policy'') is the contract between the Life 
Program and its covered members. As discussed infra, the 
statute under which the ac1.~inistrative judge made his ruling 
grants the Master Policy broad discretion regarding the 
formation of the contract between the Life Program and it's 
covered members. Ultimately, the Master Policy, as formed and 
accepted between the parties, is the contract that governs 
5 Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Servs., 217 P.3d 716, 721 
(Utah 2009). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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the distribution of plan benefits. The Master Policy 
specifically allows its covered members to incorporate 
written statements as part of the contract. 8 The Master 
Policy gives the covered member discretion to designate a 
primary beneficiary and does not prohibit a covered member 
from making beneficiary designation irrevocable. 
The undisputed facts in this case establish that Mr. 
Lopez incorporated the divorce decree into his contract with 
the Life Program by meeting the factors required by state 
law: (1) the reference to the divorce decree was clear and 
unequivocal, (2) all parties were alerted that that the 
divorce decree was being incorporated, and (3) the divorce 
decree was easily available to the parties. 9 
On December 3, 1999 Mr. Lopez submitted a Change of 
Beneficiary form to the Life Program, in accordance with the 
8 Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 244-45 ~ 19 stating "This Master 
Policy, and modification to it, and the written statements, 
if any, of Subscribers, constitute the entire contract." 
(emphasis added) 
9 Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Servs., 217 P.3d 716, 721 
(Utah 2009). 
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Q 
terms of the Master Policy, which specifically listed the 
beneficiary as "Diane (petitioner) for minor children as per 
attached divorce decree" 10 (emphasis added). By including "as 
per attached divorce decree" in the beneficiary designation, 
Mr. Lopez exercised the right to incorporate a written 
statement that would govern his contractual relationship with 
the Life Program. Mr. Lopez's written statement was clear 
and unequivocal. 
The parties were alerted to the reference. Mr. Lopez's 
clear and unequivocal statement alerted all parties to the 
incorporation of the divorce decree. The change of 
beneficiary form on its face was insufficient to establish 
who the beneficiary truly was under the life insurance. The 
form did not contain a last name for "Diane" and referenced a 
title of a party, "petitioner" that was not defined on the 
change of beneficiary form. Nevertheless, the Life Program 
did not reject the change of beneficiary form. 11 The 
referenced divorce decree was necessarily incorporated and 
the parties were aware of its necessity. 
10 Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 241-42, 1 7. 
11 Id. 1 7-9. See also R. 299, 29: 125, 30:1-8. 
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The divorce decree was available and in the possession 
of all parties to the life insurance contract. 12 Mr. Lopez 
provided a copy of the decree of divorce entered by Utah's 
Third District Court 13 by attaching a copy of the decree of 
divorce to the Change of Beneficiary form, providing the Life 
Program with the specific writing that he was referencing and 
incorporating. 
The Life Program is therefore bound by the decree's 
terms. 14 In Peterson & Simpson, the court found that, even 
though the parties did not have a copy of the incorporated 
document, as long as it was easily accessible, the terms were 
incorporated into the contract. 15 Even if the administrator 
did not have a copy of the divorce decree in his hands, it 
was easily accessible. Mr. Lopez's actions definitively 
alerted the Life Program to the terms being incorporated. 
Thus, pursuant to Peterson & Simpson, the Life Program is 
bound by the incorporated decree even if they were unaware of 
12 Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 242 ~ 8-9. 
13 Id. ~ 8. 
14 See Peterson & Simpson, 217 P.3d at 721. 
15 See. Id. 
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what the decree stated, chose not to read the decree, or 
simply did not care to implement the decree. 16 
The decree of divorce contained only one provision 
related to life insurance policies. 17 This provision ordered 
Jesse Lopez to" ... irrevocably designate [Diane Welty], as 
trustee for the minor children, beneficiary on said life 
insurance policy." 18 The decree of divorce does not need to 
specify the policy number, underwriter, or company with which 
it is held for the divorce decree to dictate the terms of the 
contract . 19 In Madsen v. Moffi tt20 the court recognized 
contractual obligations established by the decree of divorce 
although the decree failed to provide specific and correct 
facts. In the instant case, the lack of specificity in the 
decree does not alter the Life Program's obligation under the 
decree to irrevocably designate Appellant, Diane Welty, as 
beneficiary under the life insurance contract. 
16 See Id. 
17 See R. 301 Pl. Exhibit 1, Decree of Divorce, 1 24. 
18 Id.; Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 241 1 4. 
19 See Madsen v. Moffitt, 542 P.2d 187 (Utah 1975). 
20 Id. 
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B. Changing an irrevocab1e beneficiary designation is 
forbidden under Utah 1aw. 
The Life Program was forbidden from processing any 
change of beneficiary designation that altered the 
irrevocable nature of the beneficiary designation. 
Specifically, Utah law dictates that when a divorce decree 
orders that a beneficiary be irrevocable, subsequent changes 
of beneficiary are forbidden. 21 General principles of 
insurance law concur that although an insured has the right 
to change the designation of a policy's beneficiary, the 
rights of a beneficiary designated pursuant to a divorce 
decree become vested and are superior to those of any 
subsequently designated persons. 22 
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Lewis, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that an attempted change of beneficiary whereby 
the second wife was substituted for the first wife was 
21 Id. at 485. 
22 Dubois v. Smith, 599 A.2d 493, 497 (N.H. 1991) (quoting 
M. Rhodes, 5 Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law 2d § 28:36, 
at 48, § 28:41 238-39 (Rev. ed. 1984) and J.A. Appleman and 
J. Appleman, 2 Insurance Law and Practice§ 922, at 515-16 
(1966)). 
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forbidden because the divorce decree between the husband and 
the first wife ordered the husband to maintain a life 
insurance policy with the first wife as a beneficiary and 
three minor children as contingent beneficiaries. 23 After the 
husband remarried, he changed the beneficiary of the life 
insurance policy to his second wife. When the husband died, 
the children and the second wife attempted to claim the 
proceeds of the life insurance policy. The court held that 
the provisions of the divorce decree controlled the 
disposition of the life insurance policy, which rendered the 
husband's attempt to change the beneficiary to his second 
wife forbidden. 
Utah contract law binds Respondents to perform in light 
of the terms of the decree of divorce submitted by Mr. Jesse 
Lopez. Any subsequent change of beneficiary forms were 
forbidden and had no effect on Ms. Welty's contractual rights 
disclosed and known by the Life Program on or about Decerober 
3, 1999. 24 
C. Respondents were responsib1e to monitor the 
beneficiaries under Utah 1aw and the Master 
23 Travelers Ins. Co., 531 P.2d at 485. 
24 See Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 241-42 1 7. 
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Policy. 
The Life Program was responsible for reviewing and 
approving any change of beneficiary designations submitted 
by Mr. Lopez. PEHP is governed by Title 49, Chapter 20 of 
the Utah Code. In part, the Life Program is required to 
"act as a self-insurer of employee benefit plans and 
administer those plans." 25 Part of administering plans is 
reviewing and confirming change of beneficiary 
designations. The Master Policy requires that all benefits 
be payable to the beneficiary upon the death of a 
subscriber. 26 Under Utah law, the insurance company runs the 
risk of paying the policy twice if it pays pursuant to a 
forbidden change of beneficiary. 27 
Under Utah Civil Procedure, if a party to a decree of 
divorce is non-compliant, the remedy is to seek an Order to 
Show Cause from the court that issued the decree. 28 The 
court will then take steps to determine compliance with the 
25 Utah Code § 49-20-401 (1) (a) (2015). 
26 See Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 244-45 1 19 
27 Travelers Ins. Co., 531 P.2d at 485. 
28 See Generally, Utah R. Civ. Pro. 101 
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decree and, if necessary, order the breaching party to 
perform. 29 A party who seeks an order too often and without 
cause can be liable for costs of the opposing party in 
defending the action. 30 
The determination of the validity of a Change of 
Beneficiary form is solely within the Life Program's 
power31 • The Life Program was in the best position, and were 
obligated to enforce the contractual rights established by 
the decree of divorce. At the hearing held on July 16, 
2015, Mr. Lamkin, Life Program Administrator, confirmed 
that if a form was incomplete or illegible that PEHP has 
the power to not honor the form or request more information 
from the subscriber. 32 Under the terms of the Master Policy, 
the Life Program has a duty to pay the beneficiary of a 
policy. Just as it has the power and duty to review a 
Change of Beneficiary form for completeness, it accordingly 
29 See id. 
30 See Utah R. Civ. Pro. 73; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. 
31 Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 242-43 ~ 7-9. See also R. 299, 
29: 125, 30:1-8. 
32 R. 299, 30: 7-8 
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has the power and duty to verify that the change can be 
made pursuant to any terms incorporated, such as a duly 
incorporated decree of divorce. 
Respondents could have, and should have, rejected a 
Change of Beneficiary form that did not conform with the 
incorporated Divorce Decree previously submitted by Mr. 
Lopez. Ms. Welty attempted to verify the beneficiary 
designation on the insurance policy through the Life 
Program, but she was refused access to the information by 
Respondents. Subsequently, she sought an Order to Show 
Cause within the jurisdiction of the divorce proceedings in 
the Third District Court to ensure Mr. Lopez's compliance 
with the divorce decree. In November of 1999, Ms. Welty 
took the extraordinary step of paying the costs associated 
with moving the court for an order to show cause regarding 
violation of the decree of divorce. 33 Mr. Lopez represented 
to the court that he was compliant with paragraph 24 of the 
decree because he had submitted the change of beneficiary 
form to the Life Program naming Ms. Welty an irrevocable 
beneficiary of that life insurance and providing a copy of 
33 See Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 242 1 9. 
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the decree to the Life Program. The court found that to be 
sufficient compliance. 
Ms. Welty had no other recourse regarding enforcement 
of the decree's requirement that she be named as the 
irrevocable beneficiary to the life insurance held with the 
Life Program by Mr. Lopez. A former spouse is not in a 
position to verify the accuracy of a beneficiary 
designation, nor should the former spouse have to if an 
irrevocable beneficiary designation has been made. 
Life insurance programs, in administering and 
processing beneficiary forms, bear the risk of double 
payment if they pay a beneficiary that replaced an 
irrevocable beneficiary designation. Courts routinely order 
parties to maintain life insurance policies with 
irrevocable beneficiary designations to ensure support of 
minor children if the obligor parent dies while the minor 
children still rely on the obligor for support. 34 At the 
time of Mr. Lopez's death, his son was still a minor and 
relied on Mr. Lopez for support. Consequently, the Life 
Program's payment of the beneficiary to anyone but Ms. 
34 Nielson, 535 P.2d at 1240. 
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Welty violated the contract between Mr. Lopez and the Life 
Program established by the incorporation of the divorce 
decree. The Life Program's action also violated their 
duties under Utah Code Ann. § 49-20-401(1) (a). The Life 
Program should bear the risk of double payment because it 
failed to properly administer the policy by ensuring that 
the Change of Beneficiary forms comply with the 
incorporated Divorce Decree. 
II. EQUITY FAVORS A FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE LIABLE TO 
MS. WELTY AND HER SON FOR INSURANCE PROCEEDS PAID TO 
MARY ELLEN LOPEZ FROM JESSE LOPEZ'S LIFE INSURANCE 
POLICY. 
In addition to the being entitled to legal relief 
because of the Life Program's breach of contract, this Court 
should find that the Life Program is liable to Ms. Welty as 
the rightful beneficiaries under Jesse Lopez's life insurance 
policy because it is the equitable result. The principles of 
equity dictate the same result as the legal analysis for two 
reasons: A) public policy concerns favor upholding an 
irrevocable beneficiary designation pursuant to a divorce 
decree, and B) the Life Program is the only entity or 
person in a position to monitor beneficiary designations. 
Further, Jacob Lopez has now born the cost of the Life 
Program's mistake. 
34 
A.Public policy £avors honoring irrevocable bene£iciary 
designation over any subsequent changes ma.de by the 
subscriber as long as minor children are still 
reliant on the subscriber £or support. 
This Court should overrule the Order of the Utah State 
Retirement Board because it violates strong public policy 
in favor of utilizing irrevocable beneficiary designations 
in divorce decrees to ensure support of minor children 
after the death of a parent who is obligated to provide 
their support. Courts often require an obligor parent to 
provide life insurance to insure that support payments will 
continue to be available in the event of the obligor 
parent's death. 35 The State has a strong interest in 
preventing children of dissolved marriages from becoming 
charges of the State. 36 Courts have even held that children 
from a dissolved marriage have an interest in life 
insurance proceeds when the divorce decree required the 
obligor parent to maintain insurance for the children and 
the insurance policy did not name the children as 
beneficiaries. 37 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Dubois, 599 A.2d at 497 (quoting J.A. Appleman and J. 
35 
The Order of the Utah State Retirement Board clearly 
violates public policy in that it allows an obliger parent 
to avoid the support requirements placed upon it through a 
divorce decree, even when that obliger parent specifically 
incorporates the divorce decree into the terms of a life 
insurance policy. 
It is undisputed that Mr. Lopez's son, Jacob, was still 
a minor on the date Mr. Lopez died and was still dependent 
upon him for support. 38 Courts have held insurance policies 
liable for that support in circumstances with even less 
documentation and support for the incorporation of the 
divorce decree into the terms of the policy. Allowing the 
Life Program to avoid payment on an irrevocable beneficiary 
designation that was still in effect pursuant to the divorce 
decree while Mr. Lopez had minor children sets a bad 
precedent and flies in the face of well-established public 
policy in favor of supporting minor children through life 
insurance policies under a divorce decree. 
Appleman, 2 Insurance Law and Practice§ 922, at 102 
(Supp.1991)). 
38 See Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 243 1 14-15. 
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B. The Li£e Program was the on1y entity or person that 
cou1d monitor the beneficiary designations. 
It is undisputed that Ms. Welty did not have access form 
the Life Program regarding the beneficiary designation under 
Mr. Lopez's life insurance. 39 The Life Program was the only 
entity that could monitor the beneficiary designations. Ms. 
Welty could not be expected to bear the cost of filing 
motions orders to show cause to ensure that Mr. Lopez was 
compliant with the divorce decree, Ms. Lopez had already 
established that herself as the irrevocable beneficiary of 
the life insurance through the judicial process and had a 
reasonable expectation that the Life Program would abide by 
the designation in the divorce decree. 
C. Jacob Lopez has born the burden of the Life Program's 
payment pursuant to a forbidden change of beneficiary 
form. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Lopez's son, Jacob, was a 
minor at the time of Mr. Lopez's death. Ms. Welty and her son 
still relied on Mr. Lopez for support at the time of his 
death, and the life insurance policy was required to be 
irrevocable for the purpose of ensuring support for his minor 
children in the event of his death. Furthermore, Jacob and 
39 See Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 245-46 1 22. 
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Ms. Welty testified at the hearing that Mr. Lopez had taken 
out the life insurance policy to support Jacob through post-
secondary education. They also testified that Mr. Lopez 
desired that Jacob attend post-secondary education and 
strongly encouraged him to do so. 
Following his father's counsel Jacob is a recent college 
graduate, seeking to continue onto master and possible 
doctorate degrees. Now, Ms. Welty is retired and Jacob Lopez 
is saddled with student loan debt, incurred because the life 
insurance was not paid to the correct beneficiary. Ms. Welty 
and her son were harmed because of the Life Program's breach, 
and equity requires that the Life Program make Ms. Welty and 
her son whole, even if the Life Program already paid the 
policy proceeds to a subsequent, forbidden beneficiary. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should overturn the Utah Retirement Board's 
ruling and direct the Life Program to pay Ms. Welty for the 
benefit of Jacob Lopez the proceeds from the life insurance 
policy held by Mr. Lopez. 
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ADDENDUM 
The Appellants do not believe that there is an 
Addendum necessary as all referenced and necessary 
documents are included in the Index of Record filed with 
the Court on November 10, 2015. 
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellee requests oral argument in order to answer questions conce1ning 
the arguments above. 
DATED: December 21, 2015. 
Huntsman I Lofgran, PLLC 
Isl Steven M. Rogers 
STEVEN M. ROGERS 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
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